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Abstract 
Macroprudential policies have been on the spotlight at least since the last financial crisis. 
With this work, we aim to tell a short story of what these are, what have been the thoughts 
and developments around them, and where these are heading. This is mainly a synthetic 
work, with the aim of providing readers with sufficient understanding to comfortably 
discuss this subject and potentially awaken further discussion. 
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Resumo 
As políticas macroprudenciais têm estado na agenda pelo menos desde a última crise 
financeira. Com este trabalho pretende-se contar uma curta história explicando o que estas 
são, o que se tem discutido a seu respeito e qual é o rumo que estão a tomar. No fundo, 
pretende-se disponibilizar aos eventuais leitores um trabalho sintético que lhes permita uma 
reflexão crítica sobre este tema. 
 
 
Códigos-JEL: E58, G28 
Palavras-chave: Políticas Macroprudenciais, Regulação Financeira 
 v 
Table of Contents 
Biographical note ................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... iii 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. iv 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................... v 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Defining Macroprudential Regulation ................................................................................ 4 
3. Motivations ......................................................................................................................... 8 
4. Policy Instruments and Effectiveness ............................................................................... 13 
5. Policy implementation ...................................................................................................... 17 
6. Institutional design ............................................................................................................ 21 
7. New approaches ................................................................................................................ 25 
8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 27 
References ............................................................................................................................. 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
After the recent global financial crisis, macroprudential policies have increasingly become 
an important subject when discussing the future of regulation and its role in countering 
financial imbalances that arise from the normal functioning of an economy and its financial 
system. The lessons that economic agents, be them regulators, supervisory authorities, 
central banks, financial institutions and all other participants in our economic system, have 
to learn from this past crisis are essential for the future betterment of our institutions and 
economic relations. The notion that a better regulatory framework, or even a more effective 
application of the existing regulations, might have helped in preventing, or at least 
smoothen, the crisis and all of its nefarious consequences is understandably deeply 
ingrained in our society and academia. 
In the past few years, there have been consistent attempts to legitimate this notion further. 
Partly because one of the first reactions to crisis is a tendency to assign blame and look for 
responsible parties, but mostly because there is a clear conscience that some of these 
negative effects of the crisis might have been reduced or even entirely avoided. The 
prevention of these negative effects in the next crisis is of the utmost importance. This next 
crisis might still be far down the road but the lessons we learn, not only from this financial 
crisis and our reaction to it, but also from the different policies we enacted to counteract the 
effects and how we adjusted them to the mounting evidence of their success measures, will 
determine the degree in which we will be prepared or not to deal with the next crisis. Black 
swan events are by definition improbable and always unexpected. Being fully prepared for 
the unexpected is not possible because we can never know where the next crisis will come 
from. But we can definitely take steps to ensure that we have a more solid system, that will 
be able to accommodate shifts and shocks, and in which a crisis will have far less negative 
consequences. 
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A new policy framework has been repeatedly asked for, namely one placing 
macroprudential policy at an intermediary level between monetary policy and 
microprudential policy, such as the framework neatly laid out by Schoenmaker and Wierts 
(2011). Knowing that monetary policy focuses on attaining a stable price level and 
fostering economic growth, whereas microprudential regulation policies are engineered to 
assure the stability of individual financial institutions, macroprudential regulation policies 
are needed to close the gap between these two approaches. Therefore, as a complement to 
the more traditional policy levels, macroprudential policies pose one of the possible ways 
we have available to strengthen the stability of our system. 
This macroprudential focus is spurred by the acknowledgement that microprudential 
regulation, even though very necessary, is on its own insufficient to effectively counter 
systemic risk. This type of regulation mainly regards financial institutions in isolation, 
trying to ensure its individual solvability, as was clearly patent in the first and second Basel 
accords. Not diminishing the importance of this kind of regulations, which are indeed very 
necessary to assure that individual institutions are solvent, these are not sufficient to assure 
the stability of the whole financial system, in need of a clearly styled coordinated approach. 
Macroprudential regulation has been differently defined in the existing literature, and there 
are different interpretations of what the meaning of the word macroprudential actually is. 
There is a growing literature on the subject, be it from a policy perspective or from an 
implementation one, which has been significantly enriched over the past few years, and 
which greatly benefitted the discussion not only in academia but also in the intricacies of 
policy and law makers, regulators and regulated entities. In spite of this growing literature 
and discussion, there still seems to be some lack of knowledge about this matter and 
macroprudential regulation is often used, with the ground of its apparent complexity, as a 
kind of black box to which all new regulatory ideas are assigned to, which contributes to a 
lack of transparency and common ground regarding macroprudential regulation. 
We find we can contribute to the existing literature with a clarification and simplification of 
what macroprudential regulation is and with a synthesis of where the state of the art of 
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macroprudential regulation stands. The purpose of this dissertation is then to simplify, 
structure and synthetize the apparently opaque and difficult to understand issue of 
macroprudential regulation. 
This will be done through a review of the existing literature and, where possible, an attempt 
to go even further. We aim to tell a clear story of where we stand and where we should be 
heading. First, in defining what macroprudential regulation stands for, we wish to set a 
clear common ground of what these policies encompass. Second, we will dive deeper in the 
motivations for these policies, followed by a review of current available macroprudential 
policies and instruments. From there, we will address the issue of the existing frameworks 
for the implementation of the macroprudential policies and their effectiveness in real 
scenarios. Finally, we will discuss the institutional context of these policies and review 
proposals for new approaches and put our own ideas forward. 
We find that there are still many improvements to be made to the policy frameworks 
currently into place and await the new Basel accord to have a significant impact in 
changing this landscape. We also defend the separation of retail banking from investment 
banking and other risky activities in banks, which we find will reduce systemic risks. 
Mostly, we think that this work helps in mapping out past developments around 
macroprudential policies and regulation, and provides readers with a summary of essentials 
around this topic. 
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2. Defining Macroprudential Regulation 
Knowing that potentially fruitful exchanges of ideas are often crippled by the absence of a 
common understanding of basilar terms (Crockett, 2000), it is thus essential to start by 
clarifying these terms’ meanings. The word ‘prudential’ derives from the word ‘prudent’, 
an adjective, defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “sensible and careful when 
making decisions; avoiding unnecessary risks”. Prudential regulation, as can be ascertained 
from the original word’s meaning, stands for ex-ante regulation designed to prevent certain 
risks. This kind of financial regulation has commonly been divided into microprudential 
and macroprudential regulation. The first one includes the kind of prudential policies aimed 
at ensuring the stability and solvability of individual financial institutions, while the second 
looks at the stability of the whole system. The word ´macroprudential is defined by the 
Cambridge Business English Dictionary as being ‘used to describe laws, rules and 
conditions for banks and financial organizations which are intended to protect the whole 
financial system from risk’. This incremental approach to the understanding of the concept 
is rather enlightening, but we should also base our analysis upon the existing definitions in 
the literature. 
In recent years the term has been widely used, mainly because of the global financial crisis, 
but according to Clement (2010) its usage traces back to 1979, first referred to in a meeting 
of the Cooke Committee, the precursor of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS). A more common usage of the term started in the 1980’s, becoming more frequent 
since the Asian crisis of 1997. This kind of policy is described as one promoting a safe and 
sound financial system and payments mechanism. The Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) referred to macroprudential policy as the usage of prudential tools enacted with the 
clear goal of promoting a stable financial system in its entirety, and not necessarily of each 
individual institution within it contained when looked at in isolation. Anyhow, the term 
macroprudential has always concerned the stability of the financial system and its linkage 
to the general economic environment, even though this concerns focus has evolved over 
time. From focusing on excessive lending in developing countries, it shifted towards 
developments in capital markets and financial innovations, the impact of regulation on the 
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procyclical behavior of the financial system and the consequences stemming from the 
potential failure of the so called systemically important financial institutions (SIFI’s) 
(Clement, 2010). 
Macroprudential policies were defined by Crockett (2000) as policies that have as an 
objective the limitation of the economic costs of financial distress. He also focused on 
defining the term by distinguishing the micro- and macroprudential perspectives on 
financial stability, much more by regarding its objectives than the used instruments per se, 
since the microprudential objective is clearly to limit the likelihood of an individual 
institutions failure, without accounting for correlation or interconnections between the 
institutions and in the market. An instrument like the solvency standard, would be the same 
for each institution in a micro perspective, but would be subjected to an additional 
calibration if looked at from a macro perspective, to take into account the systemic 
importance of each institution. In De Nicòlo, Favara and Ratnovski (2012) this point is 
interestingly complemented upon reminder that most macroprudential instruments 
considered in literature are effectively equal to tools traditionally used in microprudential 
regulation, their macroprudential taste being given by the objective they are designed to 
pursue. 
Hanson et al. (2011) also take a cost approach and characterize macroprudential regulation 
as being tasked with controlling and preventing the social costs arising from the 
consequences of common shock to financial institutions. 
In a more complete analysis, Claessens (2014) has defined them as policies aimed at 
reducing systemic risks, which arise from financial procyclicality in excess and from 
interconnections and other cross-sectional factors. He also explains that the motivations for 
macroprudential policies are derived from market failures and externalities, which arise 
even in a scenario where other monetary policy or microprudential supervision tools are 
enacted in an effective manner, justifying the inclusion of macroprudential policies in the 
permanent recipe book for an effective supervision of the financial system. 
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Borio (2003) systematized all this in an early essay where he contrasted the macro and 
microprudential perspectives in terms of objectives and risk models, which is reflected in 
Table 1 (below): 
Table 1: The macro- and microprudential perspectives compared 
 Microprudential Macroprudential 
Proximate objective 
Limit distress of individual 
institutions 
Limit financial system-wide 
distress 
Ultimate objective 
Consumer (investor/depositor) 
protection Avoid output (GDP) costs 
Correlations and 
common exposures 
across institutions Irrelevant Important 
Calibration of 
prudential controls 
In terms of risks of individual 
institutions; bottom-up 
In terms of system-wide distress; 
top-down 
Model of Risk Exogenous (in part) endogenous 
Source: Borio (2003) 
The endogenous nature of risk, with respect to the financial system’s behavior in the model, 
allows the conception of a situation in which an action that would be desirable for an 
individual institution could produce unwanted aggregate results (Borio, 2003), because 
otherwise if risk were exogenous in the model, the impact of an action by an individual 
institution would not be significant to overall systemic risk, which is something the 
macroprudential perspective relies on. On this point lies one of the significant innovations 
of the macroprudential approach, being the foundation for the mentioned top-down 
approach. This framework was summed up by Borio (2011), defining macroprudential as a 
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perspective or orientation of supervisory or regulatory arrangements, calibrated not from an 
individual institution’s perspective but from an integrated systemic view. This author also 
warns against too broad definitions that might make the term redundant and therefore 
lacking a rich meaning, such as understanding macroprudential policies as including all 
financial stability policies, because almost any policy can have financial stability effects. 
Nonetheless he warns that the term’s usage might evolve over time to include a wider range 
of policy instruments. 
Financial instability can be seen as the main cause for macroprudential policies, as it has 
many negative consequences and it is therefore of interest to avoid it and enact stability 
policies which prevent the occurrence of these imbalances. 
Microprudential policies were, along with monetary and fiscal policy, the first response to 
counter financial instability. The microprudential perspective focused on regulating 
individual institutions in order to prevent the generation of imbalances. By limiting the risk 
positions that could be assumed by individual financial institutions, it was assumed that 
these institutions would be equally limited in their risk behaviors when taken into account 
on an aggregate level. 
However, this approach disregarded the connections between individual financial 
institutions and how they interact in the economy. Due to many different “macro-financial 
linkages” (Claessens, 2014), to which recent literature has drawn attention, there is a need 
to address all causes collectively and in a coordinated manner, in addition to the individual 
approach that is enacted through microprudential policies. 
The importance of microprudential supervision and its concrete policies should not be 
downplayed, for these are very important to the stability of the system as a whole as well. 
By implementing policies that avoid the creation of imbalances that could put the systems 
stability at risk, we are creating conditions for other policies to be more efficient and 
produce desired outcomes. 
  
 8 
3. Motivation – Market Failures / Externalities 
By laying out the most important sources of market failures that call for the use of a 
macroprudential regulatory approach, De Nicòlo, Favara and Ratnovski (2012), explain 
how a financial intermediary’s activities can lead to systemic risk and why these require 
specifically addressed policies to mitigate these risks. They argue that these regulatory 
policies are justified by the need to correct market failures, instead of simply attributing 
their existence to the financial system’s fragility. Therefore, instead of focusing on the 
smoothening of the cycles, they suggest directing that focus towards the externalities that 
market failures create and tailoring regulation to the correction of those externalities. 
The externalities that lead to these risks are divided in three categories: (i) The ones related 
to strategic complementarities, which arising from the strategic interactions of banks and 
other financial institutions and agents, cause vulnerabilities to build-up during the 
expansionary phase of the financial cycle. (ii) The ones related to fire sales and credit 
crunches, arising from a generalized asset sell-off, cause a decline in asset prices and thus a 
worsening balance sheet situation for investors and other intermediaries, which lead to a 
contraction of financing, a situation especially damaging in the contractionary phase of the 
business cycle. (iii) And the ones related to interconnectedness, which facilitate the 
propagation of systemic institution shocks to the overall financial system, this contagion 
made possible by the interconnections in financial markets and other financial networks. 
This externalities perspective serves as a good frame of reference for what the motivations 
to conduct macroprudential policies are. The enacting of policies to correct these 
externalities will mitigate systemic risk and can also be regarded as intermediate 
macroprudential policy targets. A further lesson of the crisis was the suitability of 
microprudential policies with regard to addressing systemic risk, where it became apparent 
that in some cases, the stability of an individual institution might act as a destabilizer to the 
whole system. A good example of this can be the asset fire sales that occur during a 
downturn. Even though this behavior is logical and sound from an individual institutions’ 
point of view, it may be catastrophic when looked at from an integrated perspective, for it 
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leads to a generalized depreciation of the market value of the asset in question, causing a 
significant fall in its price (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011).  
This first category of externalities, the one related to strategic complementarities, has its 
place because financial institutions have a historical tendency to assume similar credit and 
liquidity risk exposure in the upswing of the business cycle, thereby positively reinforcing 
these cycles and so accentuating the volatility of asset prices. This conscious choice to 
incur in correlated risks is justified and sustained by the fact that if more agents invest in 
the same strategy, the payoff from that specific strategy will increase. This payoff increase 
happens because the market will evaluate a bank incurring in losses at the same time as all 
other banks more leniently. Additionally, bank managers are subject to the same reasoning 
in regards to their accountability to the board. Another source of this first category of 
externalities is the increase in market competition in these boom times, which gives rise to 
a degradation of the standards through which banks evaluate the potential recipients of the 
funds they have available for lending. This behavior will result in a growth of lending 
because of the lowering standards and on average decrease the quality of the outstanding 
credit loan portfolio, a behavior that will naturally be corrected in the contractionary phase 
of the business cycle, because the worse borrowers will fail and thus be cleared from the 
portfolio. A further source of strategic complementarities could derive from the bank 
managers’ incentive structure and other reputational concerns, which reduce the risk of 
coordinating one’s actions with other banks’. This emerges because banking performance is 
normally evaluated in regard to the market and therefore the risks and costs associated with 
pursuing a different strategy, even if this strategy might be less risky and cause the bank to 
be more resilient to an eventual future shock, are logically very high. Actually, there is 
evidence that in order to maximize the likelihood that in the event of a failure, it is a 
generalized failure, banks may find themselves incentivized to strive for correlated risks 
(Farhi and Tirole, 2012). As an example, a bank manager predicting a meltdown of some 
complex derivatives markets in the years building up to the great financial crisis of 2007, 
who refused to invest in that specific risky derivatives class, would quite certainly be out of 
a job long before he would be given reason or recognized merit for his bold decision. 
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The second category of externalities that we already referred to in the previous example on 
fire sales is paradigmatic because it describes a behavior that although logical in an isolated 
perspective, loses sense when thought about in an aggregated perspective. Because they 
take place in a downturn environment, scenario in which the potential asset buyers are also 
in need to conduct sales themselves, these so called fire sales can lead to increased financial 
system fragility. A fire sale may cause a significant drop in an asset’s market price and 
consequently in the perceived value of similar assets owned by other market participants, 
which in accordance to some microprudential rules will force them to review their own 
accounting valuations of the assets in question, leading them to possible financial 
difficulties. This process causes an individual institution’s risk to become systemic, with 
severe consequences to financial stability (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011). Another 
consequence is the crunch in credit these fire sales will lead to, because when confronted 
with the need to review the valuation of their balance sheet’s items, the affected banks will 
freeze or severely constrain lending due to lack of capital. 
The third externality category we enumerated were the ones related to interconnectedness. 
Since banks operated in a highly intertwined system, any potential failure will impact other 
institutions in the same network. This contagion risk between banks cannot be eliminated 
because the shape of this interbank interconnectedness is beyond an individual bank’s 
control and because this interconnectedness may be derived from diversification and 
mutual hedging motives. 
In line with these externalities related to interconnectedness, we now refer to two different 
but nonetheless related aspects, namely systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) 
and the in the literature recently appearing application of Network Theory to the subject of 
macroprudential regulation. 
Haldane (2015) refers to the recent tendency to use financial networks theory to make sense 
of the financial system’s behavior in stress times. Attention has also been directed at the 
overall layout of public policy, for example at the addition of the new policy layer of 
macroprudential regulation to contribute to a safer financial system as a whole (Hanson et 
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al., 2011). Complex interconnectedness in the system requires an appropriate analytical 
approach. 
The externalities related to interconnectedness are particularly significant for SIFI’s 
because of their complexity, their international footprint and their basilar role in sustaining 
the global financial system. Their impact in terms of systemic risk is so significant that 
most interventions in SIFI’s were bailouts in all aspects but denomination, in order to 
protect shareholders, creditors and other agents in the market from the consequences of a 
SIFI failure. This implicit bailout guarantee that an institution acquires when it achieves a 
too big to fail degree of systemic importance, acts as a subsidy and as an incentive to risk-
taking by that institution. 
While in the past the size of a financial institution was the main aspect in defining the 
systemic importance, after the recent crisis, the interconnections of financial institutions 
have gained an increment in attention. The notion that a smaller but highly interconnected 
institution poses a potentially higher risk to financial stability than a bigger but less 
connected institution has gained traction in recent years. This may have influenced the 
criteria for designating systemic institutions. Nonetheless, after studying the significant 
variations between standalone and systemic risks of large banks during the recent financial 
crisis, Laeven et al. (2016) found that systemic risk grows with bank size and is inversely 
related to bank capital. Their results joined recent studies in discussing the imposition of 
tighter capital requirements on banks based on their systemic risk position in addition to the 
already existing restrictions. Beck et al. (2016) find capital regulation to have a positive 
impact on improving the banks’ incentives to monitor their borrowers and consequently to 
lower their individual credit risk. The new Basel accord goes in the right direction as it also 
takes into account the macro effects of capital regulation. Basel III also reviews the role of 
risk-weights in the computation of capital requirements in that it now tries to force banks 
into holding more adequate capital buffers for their risk-weighted assets. This new rules 
also take into account the systemic risks by enacting specific liquidity surcharges for 
SIFI’s. A fourth Basel accord is on the way and its impact will be significant for banks in 
areas such as the calculation of risk-weighted assets and possibly regulatory capital floors 
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(Schneider et al., 2017). These kinds of changes have different potential implications for 
banks and are to be closely watched by interested parties. 
Anyhow, the current tools available are grouped in similar categories, as we will in Table 3 
when we present the macroprudential toolkit available, but also structured in function of the 
externalities they address. The following table summarizes the externalities presented 
earlier in this section and lays out the type of policies that can be used to address these 
externalities. 
Table 2: Externalities and Macroprudential Policies 
Externalities due to: 
Can be addressed by: 
Capital 
Requirements 
(surcharges) 
Liquidity 
Requirements 
Restrictions on 
activities, assets 
or liabilities 
Taxation 
Strategic 
Complementarities 
X  X  
Fire sales X X  X 
Interconnectedness X  X X 
Source: De Nicòlo, Favara and Ratnovski (2012) 
As such, macroprudential policies emerge as a way to complement existing policies in 
trying to assure financial stability. Also, in order to help its analysis, the approach can be 
thought of as having two dimensions, namely a time-dimension and a cross-sectional 
dimension (Borio, 2011). 
In the following section we will elaborate on these instruments used to conduct 
macroprudential policies and their corresponding effectiveness. 
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4. Macroprudential Policy Instruments and their Effectiveness 
Knowing that the ultimate objective of macroprudential policies is to promote financial 
stability, there is nonetheless the need to define intermediate objectives that make the 
policies more easily applicable. The definition of these intermediate objectives is a process 
under constant review, for the determinants that contribute for these objectives to be 
selected are themselves subject to change and thus to be updated over time. This said, these 
intermediate objectives are seen as important variables or indicators of whether the ultimate 
objective is being worked towards or not. They serve as a means to make policy making 
more transparent and its application more operationally viable. These intermediate policy 
objectives could be the mitigation and prevention of an excessive growth of credit and 
leverage by banks, and this could be addressed by using macroprudential policy 
instruments such as Countercyclical Capital Buffers (CCB), Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio 
limits, caps on the loan-to-income (LTI) ratio or a limit on the debt service-to-income 
(DSTI) ratio. As a means of illustration, an LTV restriction would reduce the amount that a 
bank could loan to a certain borrower in proportion to the loans collateral. In the case of a 
house financing, an LTV of 75% would mean that the bank could only concede up to 75% 
of the house’s value to the customer. This acts as a restriction on borrowers since it 
prevents otherwise willing borrowers from lending the desired amounts, with the ultimate 
objective of protecting the financial institution against collateral value variations in the case 
the borrower becomes unable to service the loan and the collateral is transferred to the 
bank.  
These instruments have typically been grouped into five categories: (i) quantitative 
restrictions on borrowers, instruments or activities; (ii) capital requirements and dynamic 
provisioning; (iii) other quantitative restrictions on the balance sheets of financial 
institutions; (iv) Taxation on certain activities or certain balance-sheet compositions; (v) 
other measures such as accounting changes, changes to compensation and incentive 
packages, among others (Cerutti et al., 2015). 
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The first category of instruments, already mentioned above, is identifiable in that it is 
composed of concrete limits or rules, which are directed at very specific imbalances such as 
excessive indebtedness or low-quality loan making by financial institutions, by establishing 
certain thresholds which have to be respected. The second category aims at countering the 
imbalances that might arise in the financial sector’s balance sheets and are thus very 
concerned with the reserve capital requirements, liquidity limits or financial exposures by 
the institutions. The third category is endemically connected to countercyclical behavior in 
that it follows the macroeconomic policy of moderating the variations of the economic 
cycle by deploying measures that act as contrary forces, such as countercyclical capital 
requirements, which rise in a upward cycle and fall in a downward cycle, thus being 
adaptive to serve its purpose. The fourth category relies on using taxes to conduct directed 
macroprudential policies. Finally, all other tools such as governance, accounting standards 
or institutional infrastructure are included in the fifth category. 
In the expansionary phase, with the purpose of enhancing resilience, the adequate policy 
tools are considered to be the restrictions related to the borrower or the restrictions on 
balance sheet composition in the financial sector. With the purpose of dampening the cycle, 
the usage of capital requirements and dynamic provisioning is favored. Taxation and levies 
are enacted with the purpose of dispelling the gestation of the cycle. In the contractionary 
phase, characterized by fire-sales and a generalized credit crunch, the tools that are aimed at 
dampening the cycle are also of a restrictive nature, namely by adjusting to specific loan-
loss provisioning, margins or haircuts. With regard to enhancing resilience, the 
establishment of liquidity limits, such as the Net Stable Funding Ratio, the Liquidity 
Coverage ratio, or countercyclical capital requirements are encouraged. Finally, taxing non-
core liabilities is also a tool with the purpose of dispelling the gestation of the cycle. 
In the table displayed below, we uncover the Macroprudential Toolkit available, in the way 
presented by Claessens et al. (2013). The tools are divided as being applicable to three 
different categories, namely the expansionary phase, the contractionary phase and a third 
phase to address problems of contagion or shock propagation from SIFI’s or Networks. 
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Table 3: The Macroprudential Toolkit 
 Restrictions related 
to borrower, 
instrument, or 
activity 
Restrictions on 
financial sector balance 
sheets (assets, liabilities) 
Capital requirements, 
provisioning, 
surcharges 
Taxation, 
levies 
Other 
(including 
institutional 
infrastructure) 
Expansionary 
Phase 
Time varying 
caps/limits/rules on: 
- DTI, LTI, LTV  
- margins, hair-cuts  
- lending to sectors 
- credit growth  
 
Time varying caps/limits 
on:  
- mismatches (FX, interest 
rate) 
- reserve requirements  
 
Countercyclical capital 
requirements, leverage 
restrictions, general 
(dynamic) provisioning  
 
Levy/tax on 
specific assets 
and/or liabilities  
 
- Accounting 
(e.g., varying 
rules on mark to 
market)  
- Changes to 
compensation, 
market discipline, 
governance  
Contractionary 
Phase: 
fire-sales, 
credit crunch 
Adjustment to specific 
loan-loss provisioning, 
margins or hair-cuts 
(e.g., through the 
cycle, dynamic)  
 
Liquidity limits (e.g., Net 
Stable Funding Ratio, 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio)  
 
 
 
Countercyclical capital  
requirements, general 
(dynamic) provisioning 
 
Levy/tax (e.g., 
on non- core 
liabilities)  
 
-Standardized 
products -OTC 
vs. on exchange  
-Safety net 
(Central 
Bank/Treasury 
liquidity, fiscal 
support)  
Contagion, or 
shock 
propagation 
from SIFI’s or 
networks 
Varying restrictions on 
asset composition, 
activities (e.g., 
Volcker, Vickers  
 
Institution-specific limits 
on (bilateral) financial 
exposures, other balance 
sheet measures  
 
Capital surcharges linked 
to systemic risk  
 
Tax/levy 
varying by 
externality (size,  
network)  
 
- Institutional 
infrastructure 
(e.g., CCPs)  
- Resolution (e.g., 
living wills) 
- Varying 
information, 
disclosure  
Source: Claessens, Ghosh and Mihet (2013) 
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Bruno et al. (2017) studied the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential 
polices in 12 Asia-Pacific economies and their findings suggested macroprudential policies 
to be more effective when complementing monetary policies in reinforcing those objectives 
than when acting in opposite directions.  
In fact, with regard to the effectiveness of macroprudential policies, it is still quite difficult 
to evaluate regulatory actions. The absence of clear metrics to quantify the impact of some 
specific policy is one of the main challenges in current macroprudential policy (Kohn, 
2016). Another aspect in the assessment of this impact is the difficulty in setting a 
counterfactual scenario, i.e. what would have happened without the implementation of the 
specific macroprudential policy under evaluation (Bruno et al., 2017). 
Cerutti et al. (2015) document that the usage of macroprudential policies is more frequent 
in emerging economies, especially policies related to foreign exchange. In more advanced 
economies borrower based policies such as limits on LTV or DTI ratios tend to be more 
used, especially in more recent times. Both emerging and advanced economies use some 
policies aimed at reducing systemic risks that arise within the financial system, including 
interconnections between banks, and some of these policies have been associated with 
lower credit growth rates. The borrower based policies and the financial sector balance 
sheet policies seem to be significantly effective in achieving their goals, more so on booms 
than on busts. In more open economies with more sophisticated financial systems, 
macroprudential policies tend to have weaker effects thus implying that the markets 
circumvent some of these policies.  
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5. Policy implementation 
The changes to regulatory supervision regarding the banking system that emerged after the 
great financial crisis have established new authorities as responsible for macroprudential 
policies. Haldane (2015) structures the different levels of regulatory resolution as 
microscopic, macroscopic and telescopic. The microscopic layer focuses on individual 
entities and therefore on the microprudential dimension. The macroscopic layer focuses on 
the national economies and financial systems, the macroprudential and monetary policy 
perspectives. Lastly, the telescopic layer regards the global financial and economic system, 
being thus the global financial architecture regulatory dimension. These layers are both 
complex and likely to interact, which makes the system as a whole more complex as well. 
This higher level of complexity requires an adequate theoretical framework to support the 
implementation of policies. Schoenmaker & Wierts (2016) propose a new policy 
framework by placing macroprudential policy between microprudential supervision and 
monetary policy. Macroprudential policies are thus operating at the financial system level 
and are aimed at promoting stability by addressing the impact that specific imbalances have 
on the economy in general. 
The significant policy framework changes after the recent crisis follow the Tinbergen Rule, 
according to which every policy layer needs a corresponding set of tools available 
(Haldane, 2015), much as is laid out in the following Table. 
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Table 4: Policy framework for the financial and economic system 
Policy 
(typical instrument) 
Objective Ultimate goal 
(level of impact) 
Monetary Policy 
(short-term interest rate) 
Price stability 
Stable and Non-inflationary 
growth 
(economic system) 
Macroprudential 
(LTV ratios, countercyclical 
buffers) 
Financial stability 
Microprudential 
(capital ratios) 
Soundness of financial 
institutions 
Protection of consumers 
(individual institutions) 
Source: Schoenmaker and Wierts (2016) 
 
The challenges posed in the implementation of macroprudential policies were addressed in 
Kohn (2016) where he systematized them in four categories: (i) identification and 
monitoring of risks; (ii) determination of the systemic aspects of risks that are identified, 
externalities calling for macroprudential action; (iii) design of policies to address systemic 
risks and enhancing the UK’s financial system resilience, also conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis of every policy option; (iv) effective communication of policies and their inherent 
rationality and motivation. 
Being risk identification the foundation for macroprudential action, its main challenges are 
related to the fact that regulators mostly have to be looking for unlikely events with 
potentially damaging systemic effects, be them events such as the UK Referendum on EU 
membership delivered an unexpected result. There still lacks a clear idea of this events’ 
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potential repercussions to financial stability. On another level, this risk identification also 
consists in identifying tendencies that may be arising in certain markets, which can 
gradually bring changes that give rise to systemic risks, an example of this were the 
impacts of eased asses to credit to buy residential real estate before the crisis. In order to 
assist with this risk identification, macroprudential regulation authorities have at their 
disposal a certain number of indicators, and its usage needs to be careful. 
The point concerning policy design focuses on the criterion of benefits exceeding costs and 
thus on finding the instruments that most adequately fulfill this premise. There are 
difficulties both in estimating the benefits and the costs of policies. The marginal benefits 
of a particular policy choice are highly dependent on other policies in action and thus very 
hard to measure. On the cost side, measuring difficulties are also abundant because in 
addition to direct costs that institutions bear, there are also indirect costs that are sometimes 
both unintended and deferred in time, thus making it impossible to correctly account for 
them. Beyond these costs, there are also the expected output changes that are to some 
degree attributable to macroprudential policies and thus impacted by them (Kohn, 2016). 
Finally, the last aspect focused on, is adequately communicating and explaining the 
rationale behind macroprudential policies. This means that after identifying the risk and the 
externality, and the policy to address it decided upon, it is of the uttermost importance to 
publicly communicate the decisions, as well as its expected consequences and impact, in 
the name of transparency, but also to appease the general public and the interested parties. 
Political and public support is indeed critical because effective macroprudential policy will 
be countercyclical and thus highly unpopular in boom times, where some moderation will 
be needed to allow for stimuli in the bust times that will follow them. Preemptive and 
countercyclical policies always leave plenty of room for misinterpretation and therefore an 
effective, transparent communication policy is very necessary to avoid a lack of public 
support, which will likely bring set the ground for political interference in policy making. 
Clear communication strategies are regarded as essential ingredients for successful 
macroprudential regimes because they contribute for the accountability and efficacy of 
policymakers, by shaping and anchoring the expectations of stakeholders. 
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A clear communication allows for policies to be predictable and transparent, and thus find 
more support among stakeholders, which trust the macroprudential authorities discretion 
and exercised judgment, even when the implemented long-term measures don’t 
immediately have a positive impact (Skingsley, 2016). Actually, as we can see from the 
example given in Kohn (2016), the absence of an adverse public reaction to a set of 
recommendations issued by the Bank of England was directly attributed to the 
communication strategy followed by the institution. The fact that they were transparent in 
communicating their intentions, rationale and expected results well ahead of time appeased 
the public and justified the quiet acceptance. Schoenmaker and Wierts (2011) defend that 
macroprudential policy authorities should be accountable to the general public as well as to 
the political and judicial power in a way that minimizes their vulnerability to pressures. The 
fact that regulated financial institutions may always appeal decisions by regulators is seen 
as positively contributing to a fair balance in the accountability of the regulatory process. 
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6. The importance of institutional design 
One of the most determining aspects of the impact of macroprudential policies is related 
with the way its institutional arrangements are designed. Hereby we mean that the 
institutions that are responsible for the design of these policies need to fulfill certain criteria 
for independence and resistance to pressures, as well as be in close contact with monetary 
authorities and also to possess a great deal of technical know-how to conduct the policy 
making per se. These organs need to be accountable and therefore their action highly 
transparent. Schoenmaker and Wierts (2011) argue that the policy mandate for 
macroprudential policies be given to a single authority so that efficient and timely decision-
making is fostered. They also defend that this authority should be the central bank, because 
both its mandates for price and for financial stability are directed at steering the overall 
economy, even though with different objectives. 
At a European level, the 2009 de Larosière report issued a recommendation that an 
independent, decentralized, supervisory system be created. This recommendation prompted 
the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), which resulted in a 
binary system of national and European supervision with different assignments being 
distributed between the entities, namely with distinctions between microprudential and 
macroprudential regulatory responsibilities. 
The macroprudential oversight of the financial system has been attributed to the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which has been established as the agency tasked with 
preventing and mitigating systemic risks to financial stability in the European Union. Even 
though this is an independent agency, it has been established under the umbrella of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and its Chairman is Mario Draghi, the ECB’s president. 
In Portugal, the designated authority for macroprudential supervision is the national central 
bank, Banco de Portugal. Its concrete mandate of conducting macroprudential policy 
consists of “identifying, monitoring and assessing systemic risk, and [by] proposing and 
adopting measures to prevent, mitigate or reduce such risks in order to strengthen the 
resilience of the financial sector” (Banco de Portugal, 2015). 
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In the UK, the responsibility for conducting macroprudential policy falls upon the Financial 
Policy Committee at the Bank of England. Its mandate is to achieve the Financial Stability 
Objective of the Bank, by recognizing, monitoring and actively reduce or remove, the 
systemic risks, with the objective of protecting and reinforcing the UK Financial System 
(Tucker et al., 2013). 
In the US there is no agency with the sole responsibility of assuring financial system 
stability being this incumbency divided between different agencies. Nonetheless, according 
to Haltom & Weinberg (2017), some of these financial stability responsibilities have been 
progressively shifted towards the Fed, after the great financial crisis of 2007-08, namely 
because of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, giving 
the Fed a unique role in financial regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act required financial 
stability to be taken into account in the course of regulatory actions, but most importantly, 
it created the Financial Stability Oversight Board (FSOC), with the mandate to identify 
risks to financial stability, to promote market discipline by reducing the expectation of 
government bailouts and to respond to threats to the financial system. However, the FSOC 
is not the agency responsible for financial stability but a convening board of all regulatory 
agencies. It also falls within the mandate of the FSOC the identification of systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFI’s), which can put the financial system’s stability at 
risk upon failure or distress. The Fed plays an outsized role because of its primary mandate 
to conduct monetary policy, operate the payments system and supervise banks, which 
consequently forces it to play a more significant role in the pursuit of policies that 
contribute to the stability of the financial system (Haltom & Weinberg, 2017). 
As we have highlighted in the previous section, a clear communication strategy is essential 
to enact certain policies in an effective way. Nier et al. (2011) have made an interesting 
study of the ideal macroprudential policy arrangements, diving into issues of institutional 
structures, policy-making, effectiveness and accountability, from which we highlight the 
following Box, providing us with a systematization, and where needed a brief explanation, 
of the key desirables for macroprudential policy arrangements: 
 23 
Box 1. Key Desirables for Macroprudential Policy Arrangements 
General 
1. The central bank should play an important role in macroprudential policymaking, 
because of the available expertise and to coordinate with other central bank 
functions such as monetary policy or regulatory oversight. 
2. Complex and fragmented regulatory structures are unlikely to be conducive to 
successful mitigation of systemic risk and should therefore be avoided, because 
fragmentation reduces the effectiveness of risk identification and introduces 
frictions due to dispersed decision-making. 
3. Participation of the treasury (ministry of finance) in the policy process is useful, 
because it can provide a bridge with the legislative authorities and assist in policy 
coordination. But a leading role poses risks of delaying action and compromising 
the institutional independency of policies. 
4. Systemic risk prevention and crisis management are different policy functions that 
should be supported by separate organizational arrangements. 
5. Macroprudential policy frameworks should not become a vehicle to compromise the 
autonomy of other established policies.  
6. Chosen institutional arrangements need to take account of country-specific 
circumstances. 
 
Provide for effective identification, analysis, and monitoring of systemic risk  
7. Mechanisms for effective sharing of all information needed to assess systemic risks 
should be in place, by allowing authorities to collect, centralize and share relevant 
data. 
8. At least one institution involved in assessing systemic risk should have access to all 
relevant data and information. It should be the one that disposes of the best existing 
expertise to assess systemic risk. 
 
 24 
Provide for timely and effective use of macroprudential policy tools  
9. A lead macroprudential authority should be identified and be provided with a clear 
mandate and powers, in a manner that harnesses incentives of existing institutions to 
mitigate systemic risk. Its mandate needs to be matched by sufficient powers, 
including to initiate the use of prudential tools to address systemic risk. Mechanisms 
should be established to expand powers when needed.   
10. Institutional mechanisms should support willingness to act against the buildup of 
systemic risk and reduce the risk of delay in policy actions. 
11. The mandate should give primacy to the mitigation of systemic risk, but include 
secondary objectives to ensure that the policymaker takes into account costs and 
trade-offs.   
12. Proper accountability and transparency need to be put in place, without unduly 
compromising the effectiveness of macroprudential policy, to guard against overly 
restrictive or inadequate policy. 
 
Provide for effective coordination across policies to address systemic risk  
13. Institutional integration of financial regulatory functions within the central bank can 
support effective coordination of macroprudential policy with monetary as well as 
microprudential policy, but also requires safeguards such as separate accountability 
mechanisms. 
14. Where institutional separation of policy decisions and control over policy tools 
cannot be avoided, the legal framework needs to assign formal powers to 
recommend or direct action of other policymakers. 
15. Where there is distributed decision making among several agencies, establishing a 
coordinating committee is useful, but may not necessarily be sufficient to overcome 
collective action and accountability problems. 
 
Source: Nier et al. (2011) 
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7. Proposing new approaches 
A review of current regulatory practices is needed in the near future. Even though most 
seem to be effective, we lack the knowledge that these will be effective in the case of an 
extreme shock. Multiple claims have been put forward to favor a simplification of 
regulation, namely the legal documents that set the framework for regulatory practices and 
also the used instruments per se. More transparent practices, easier to follow and 
understand, are therefore called for, not only by banks and other regulated financial 
institutions, but also by regulators themselves, who are increasingly overwhelmed with the 
oversight of numerous regulations and can hardly keep up with the detail into which these 
have evolved to. 
We propose two different courses of action to be taken. 
First, we strongly defend the separation of commercial banking activities that consist of 
simple deposit taking and credit concession, from the remaining financial markets oriented 
activities, such as Derivatives, Bonds and other more complex financing forms, and from 
the investment banking activities. These should be separated into distinct legal entities, 
much in the line of what was the spirit of the 1933 Glass-Steagall act in the US, that have 
actually no relationships among them, apart from the ones that occur in the market, 
transparent and easily controlled by the regulators. 
Alternatively, as a complement to the first proposal, we argue that a ring fencing of the 
risk-bearing activities of banks and other financial institutions from the remaining 
“simpler” activities should exist, even if this does not mean a total separation into two 
distinct entities. These would be separated inside the banks and would be run by different 
people. Deposit insurance would cover one part of the balance sheet, but not the other. 
Riskless, dull, deposits would have more stringent rules to prevent their usage for lending 
and would be ensured by the global deposit insurance. Other riskier activities would be not 
insured and would therefore be the responsibility of their owners. In the UK, the Banking 
Reform Act of 2013 recommended the effective separation of investment banking from 
core retail banking activities by January 1st, 2019 (Parliament, U. K., 2013). 
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Second, either as a complement to the first proposition or in addition to the present 
framework, we defend the simplification of the whole process. Knowing that the simple 
banking activities consist of the so-called maturity transformations, i.e. collecting short-
term deposits and lending to long-term credit seekers. This poses a risk, because the former 
are necessarily liquid assets and the latter are illiquid assets to which the banks will not be 
able to recur in case liquidity is needed. As such, we argue that there should be a higher, 
more even, non-discriminatory, capital requirement, that forces the banks to conduct a more 
thorough examination of the credit risk determinants, and thus diminish the default rate on 
their outstanding loans. A clear definition of responsibilities in case of a failure has to be on 
place. There has been recent talk about “living wills” by banks, which we don’t see as 
practicable. A simpler approach is needed, and these past developments have shown that 
we are on the right track. 
A last thought devoted to the future challenges, inspired by Borio (2011), who reminds us 
that financial instability can also come from the public sector and that as such, this might be 
an aspect to be taken into account in future adjustments to the macroprudential approach. 
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8. Conclusion 
It is clear that we have the means, and the obligation, to create a more resilient system, by 
putting into practice the different preventive policies that we have described. This brief 
essay on macroprudential policies and the way these interact with regulation cannot but end 
with a laudatory note on the developments that have occurred since the last crisis. It is well 
accepted by almost everybody, alas it was one of the great lessons from this last crisis, that 
more crises will occur and that some are unpreventable. Nonetheless, this difficulty in 
preparing for the unknown does not mean we are without means to resist.  
After introducing the subject and its main aspects, we derived to the instruments of 
macroprudential policies in themselves, and also their effectiveness. We discussed its 
positioning among other kind of policies and detailed the institutional settings that involve 
them. We therefore conclude that some studies are indeed still necessary but the most 
important developments will come from the concrete application of many of these 
theoretical concepts. 
One of the motivating characteristics of macroprudential policies is that these are relatively 
easy to adapt and to fine-tune. On the other side, one of the downsides is the difficulty to 
measure their impact. But anyhow, we argue for a simplification of the whole process, with 
less intervention from regulators and a higher involvement of the regulated entities in all 
phases of the process. 
Steps have been taken in the right direction but more is needed. There are many aspects to 
be improved and contribute to a better, safer, more resistant financial system that fulfills its 
primary role of service to the economy. 
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